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Ibn Taymiyya on Universals: Nominalism, Textual Hermeneutics, and the Question of Scientific Rationality

Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam · Vol. 11 No. 1 (2026) · hlm. 215–228

DOI
10.15575/jaqfi.v11i1.46045
ISSN
2714-9420, 2541-352X
Terbit
2026-08-05
Penerbit
Jurusan Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam Universitas Negri Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung
Bahasa
eng

Abstrak

It is frequently asserted that Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 728/1328) denial of extramental universals commits him to an anti-abstractionist literalism and, ultimately, to hostility toward scientific rationality. This article argues that the assertion rests on a conflation of three logically independent theses — a metaphysical thesis about universals, a hermeneutical thesis about textual meaning, and an epistemological thesis about the sources of knowledge — and that once these are disentangled, the inference to antagonism toward science does not follow. Working from al-Radd ʿalā al-Manṭiqiyyīn and Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, and using conceptual analysis together with a historically disciplined philosophical hermeneutics, the study advances three findings. First, Ibn Taymiyya's position on universals is better described as a moderate conceptualism than as radical nominalism, and on the narrow question of the universal's mode of existence it stands closer to Avicenna than is usually recognised. Second, his critique of the syllogism is driven by an epistemological preference for sense, experience, and reasoning from particulars; he is therefore a defender of induction rather than its opponent, and the widespread characterisation of him as anti-inductive inverts his actual position. Third, and consequently, the genuine difficulty in his thought is not hostility to empirical inquiry but a justification gap: having denied that shared natures exist extramentally, he lacks a metaphysical warrant for the inductive generalisations upon which he himself relies — a difficulty he shares with the empiricist tradition from Hume onward. Reframing the problem in this way is more faithful to the texts and relocates Ibn Taymiyya from the position of an adversary of science to that of an early participant in a problem internal to empiricism itself.

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  • Indonesia University of Education
  • Universitas Islam Nusantara
  • Islamic University of Madinah
  • Suez Canal University
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Rekan penulisOrganisasiArtikel bersama
Mirza Ghulam Akbar Al HafidzIndonesia University of Education1
Rinaldi SupriadiIndonesia University of Education1
Iqbal ShihabIslamic University of Madinah1
Heru PratiknoIndonesia University of Education1
Kokok Dj PurwantoAfiliasi tidak diketahui1
Diden RosendaAfiliasi tidak diketahui1
Yusuf Ali TantowiIndonesia University of Education1
Syihabuddin SyihabuddinIndonesia University of Education1
Mohamed Mohamed Emam DawoodSuez Canal University1
Tri Indri HardiniIndonesia University of Education1
Mahardhika ZifanaIndonesia University of Education1

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Sumber metadata: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) https://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/jaqfi/oai, pertama di-harvest 7 Nov 2026, terakhir terlihat 16 Nov 2026.
Metadata asli (oai_dc)
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en-US">Ibn Taymiyya on Universals: Nominalism, Textual Hermeneutics, and the Question of Scientific Rationality</dc:title>
	<dc:creator>Teddy Yusuf</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Dadang Sudana</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Mohamad Zaka Al Farisi</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Aceng Ruhendi Saifullah</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Nur Ainiyah</dc:creator>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US">universals</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US">Ibn Taymiyya</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US"> nominalism</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US">induction</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US">philosophy of science </dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US">textual hermeneutics</dc:subject>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en-US">It is frequently asserted that Ibn Taymiyya's (d. 728/1328) denial of extramental universals commits him to an anti-abstractionist literalism and, ultimately, to hostility toward scientific rationality. This article argues that the assertion rests on a conflation of three logically independent theses — a metaphysical thesis about universals, a hermeneutical thesis about textual meaning, and an epistemological thesis about the sources of knowledge — and that once these are disentangled, the inference to antagonism toward science does not follow. Working from al-Radd ʿalā al-Manṭiqiyyīn and Darʾ Taʿāruḍ al-ʿAql wa al-Naql, and using conceptual analysis together with a historically disciplined philosophical hermeneutics, the study advances three findings. First, Ibn Taymiyya's position on universals is better described as a moderate conceptualism than as radical nominalism, and on the narrow question of the universal's mode of existence it stands closer to Avicenna than is usually recognised. Second, his critique of the syllogism is driven by an epistemological preference for sense, experience, and reasoning from particulars; he is therefore a defender of induction rather than its opponent, and the widespread characterisation of him as anti-inductive inverts his actual position. Third, and consequently, the genuine difficulty in his thought is not hostility to empirical inquiry but a justification gap: having denied that shared natures exist extramentally, he lacks a metaphysical warrant for the inductive generalisations upon which he himself relies — a difficulty he shares with the empiricist tradition from Hume onward. Reframing the problem in this way is more faithful to the texts and relocates Ibn Taymiyya from the position of an adversary of science to that of an early participant in a problem internal to empiricism itself.</dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en-US">Jurusan Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam Universitas Negri Sunan Gunung Djati Bandung</dc:publisher>
	<dc:date>2026-08-05</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
	<dc:type xml:lang="en-US">Peer-reviewed Article</dc:type>
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	<dc:identifier>https://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/jaqfi/article/view/46045</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.15575/jaqfi.v11i1.46045</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en-US">Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam; Vol. 11 No. 1 (2026): Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam; 215-228</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2714-9420</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2541-352X</dc:source>
	<dc:source>10.15575/jaqfi.v11i1</dc:source>
	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/jaqfi/article/view/46045/16940</dc:relation>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en-US">Copyright (c) 2026 Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam</dc:rights>
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