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INFLATION TARGETING UNDER IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY: LESSONS FROM INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE

Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan · Vol. 13 No. 3 (2011) · hlm. 271–306

DOI
10.21098/bemp.v13i3.394
ISSN
2460-9196, 1410-8046
Terbit
2011-05-30
Penerbit
Bank Indonesia
Bahasa
eng

Abstrak

This paper try to assess role of credibility in the implementation of inflation targeting framework in Indonesia. It illustrates how credibility may play an important role in the evolution of the Indonesian monetary policy. Knowing the degree of credibility would beneficial for Bank Indonesia (BI) to understand how to adjust policy instrument to achieve a long-term inflation target. Scaled from zero (purely not credible) to one (perfect credibility), our quantitative measurements found that credibility index for Indonesian monetary policy converge to around 0.5. Refer to projection and simulation results in this paper, the study shows expectation inflation of economic agents is strongly influenced by monetary policy credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectation would anchor to its target. In addition, high credibility also increase the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission since the disinflation cost represented by sacrifice ratio is lower. Under imperfect credibility the central bank prefer to attain its inflation target gradually, and if the credibility stock is doubled, then achieving its long-term inflation target required a lot shorter time (approximately 0.4 periods than the baseline).

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Rekan penulisOrganisasiArtikel bersama
Nur M. Adhi PurwantoBank Indonesia5
Wahyu Ari WibowoBank Indonesia2
Endy Dwi TjahjonoBank Indonesia2
Fajar OktiyantoBank Indonesia1
Mahyus EkanandaBank Indonesia1
Benny SiswantoBank Indonesia1
Yati KurniatiBank Indonesia1

Afiliasi berasal dari OpenAlex; metadata OAI-PMH jurnal tidak memuatnya. Penulis tanpa ID OpenAlex dicocokkan berdasarkan nama, sehingga dua orang bisa tergabung atau satu orang bisa terpisah.

Sumber metadata: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) https://www.bmeb-bi.org/index.php/BEMP/oai, pertama di-harvest 8 Nov 2026, terakhir terlihat 16 Nov 2026.
Metadata asli (oai_dc)
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en-US">INFLATION TARGETING UNDER IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY: LESSONS FROM INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE</dc:title>
	<dc:creator>Harmanta, Harmanta</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Bathaluddin, M. Barik</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Waluyo, Jati</dc:creator>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en-US">This paper try to assess role of credibility in the implementation of inflation targeting framework in Indonesia. It illustrates how credibility may play an important role in the evolution of the Indonesian monetary policy. Knowing the degree of credibility would beneficial for Bank Indonesia (BI) to understand how to adjust policy instrument to achieve a long-term inflation target. Scaled from zero (purely not credible) to one (perfect credibility), our quantitative measurements found that credibility index for Indonesian monetary policy converge to around 0.5. Refer to projection and simulation results in this paper, the study shows expectation inflation of economic agents is strongly influenced by monetary policy credibility. The more credible the monetary policy, the faster inflation expectation would anchor to its target. In addition, high credibility also increase the efficiency of the monetary policy transmission since the disinflation cost represented by sacrifice ratio is lower. Under imperfect credibility the central bank prefer to attain its inflation target gradually, and if the credibility stock is doubled, then achieving its long-term inflation target required a lot shorter time (approximately 0.4 periods than the baseline).
&amp;nbsp;</dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en-US">Bank Indonesia</dc:publisher>
	<dc:date>2011-05-30</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
	<dc:type xml:lang="en-US">Peer-reviewed Article</dc:type>
	<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
	<dc:identifier>https://www.bmeb-bi.org/index.php/BEMP/article/view/394</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.21098/bemp.v13i3.394</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en-US">Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan; Vol 13 No 3 (2011); 271-306</dc:source>
	<dc:source xml:lang="id-ID">Buletin Ekonomi Moneter dan Perbankan; Vol 13 No 3 (2011); 271-306</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2460-9196</dc:source>
	<dc:source>1410-8046</dc:source>
	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://www.bmeb-bi.org/index.php/BEMP/article/view/394/369</dc:relation>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en-US">Copyright (c) 2015 Harmanta Harmanta, M. Barik Bathaluddin, Jati Waluyo</dc:rights>
</oai_dc:dc>