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Jurnal SINTA 1

Upah Sistem Bagi Hasil Dan Penyerapan Tenaga Kerja

Economic Journal of Emerging Markets · Vol. 7 No. 1 (2009)

DOI
10.20885/%ejem.v7i1.658rt
ISSN
2502-180X, 2086-3128
Terbit
2009-07-28
Penerbit
Universitas Islam Indonesia
Bahasa
eng

Abstrak

Reducing unemployment and then creating productive employment are two of the greatest obstacles in most developing countries. Achieving the two programs, however, faces a dilemma. In one hand, creating employment widely leads to decline labor’s compensation. On the other hand, increasing labor’s compensations imply that employers would alter their production techniques into capital intensives (i.e. lay off their workers). This paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit sharing component are less susceptible to lay off in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed, time-based wage. The theory is tested on macroeconomic data, especially in the two selected manufacturing industries in Indonesia. The estimation result shows that profit-sharing meet the theoretical requirements for stabilizing employment. It means that profit sharing could be considered as a means to combat unemployment.

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Sumber metadata: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) http://journal.uii.ac.id/index.php/JEP/oai, pertama di-harvest 8 Nov 2026, terakhir terlihat 16 Nov 2026.
Metadata asli (oai_dc)
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en-US">Upah Sistem Bagi Hasil Dan Penyerapan Tenaga Kerja</dc:title>
	<dc:creator>Kuncoro, Haryo</dc:creator>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en-US">Reducing unemployment and then creating productive employment are two of the greatest obstacles in most developing countries. Achieving the two programs, however, faces a dilemma. In one hand, creating employment widely leads to decline labor’s compensation. On the other hand, increasing labor’s compensations imply that employers would alter their production techniques into capital intensives (i.e. lay off their workers). This paper tests the hypothesis that workers whose compensation packages contain a profit sharing component are less susceptible to lay off in the face of negative shocks to product demand than are workers paid a fixed, time-based wage. The theory is tested on macroeconomic data, especially in the two selected manufacturing industries in Indonesia. The estimation result shows that profit-sharing meet the theoretical requirements for stabilizing employment. It means that profit sharing could be considered as a means to combat unemployment.</dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en-US">Universitas Islam Indonesia</dc:publisher>
	<dc:date>2009-07-28</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
	<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
	<dc:identifier>https://journal.uii.ac.id/JEP/article/view/658</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.20885/%ejem.v7i1.658rt</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en-US">Economic Journal of Emerging Markets; Vol. 7 No. 1 (2002)</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2502-180X</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2086-3128</dc:source>
	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://journal.uii.ac.id/JEP/article/view/658/582</dc:relation>
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