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Generalist CEOs and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Indonesia

Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business (GamaIJB) · Vol. 28 No. 1 (2026) · pp. 1–24

DOI
10.22146/gamaijb.116168
ISSN
2338-7238, 1411-1128
Published
2026-02-09
Publisher
Master in Management, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada
Language
eng
License
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0

Abstract

This study examines the impact of generalist CEOs on the cost of debt in Indonesia, using data from public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2015 and 2021. Employing panel data regression with a random effects model, Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), and Heckman's two-stage regression, the results indicate that companies with generalist CEOs incur higher debt costs. Additional analyses confirm that specialist CEOs are associated with lower debt costs, reinforcing the main findings. These results highlight how generalist CEOs, with their broad industry experience, may increase perceived financial risk, leading creditors to impose higher interest rates. From a practical perspective, these findings provide valuable insights for investors, corporate boards, and policymakers in aligning CEO selection processes with firm-specific financial objectives to mitigate risks. From a social perspective, the findings underscore the importance of addressing financial risks associated with generalist CEOs, particularly in Indonesia, where high information asymmetry and inefficient capital markets persist. Elevated borrowing costs could hinder corporate investments and broader economic growth. By integrating these findings into governance practices, this study contributes to sustainable development and financial stability in emerging markets

Keywords

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Metadata source: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) https://journal.ugm.ac.id/gamaijb/oai, first harvested 28 Okt 2026, last seen 28 Okt 2026.
Original metadata (oai_dc) 
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en-US">Generalist CEOs and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Indonesia</dc:title>
	<dc:creator>Suhardianto, Novrys</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Ningsih, Sri</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Rahmatulloh, Sahrian Aditya</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Nasih, Mohammad</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Putri, Oudyza Oktavia</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Nuryaddin, Zayyan Ahmad</dc:creator>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US"></dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US">generalist CEOs, cost of debt, governance, industry experience</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en-US">G300, M120, M410</dc:subject>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en-US">This study examines the impact of generalist CEOs on the cost of debt in Indonesia, using data from public companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) between 2015 and 2021. Employing panel data regression with a random effects model, Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), and Heckman's two-stage regression, the results indicate that companies with generalist CEOs incur higher debt costs. Additional analyses confirm that specialist CEOs are associated with lower debt costs, reinforcing the main findings. These results highlight how generalist CEOs, with their broad industry experience, may increase perceived financial risk, leading creditors to impose higher interest rates. From a practical perspective, these findings provide valuable insights for investors, corporate boards, and policymakers in aligning CEO selection processes with firm-specific financial objectives to mitigate risks. From a social perspective, the findings underscore the importance of addressing financial risks associated with generalist CEOs, particularly in Indonesia, where high information asymmetry and inefficient capital markets persist. Elevated borrowing costs could hinder corporate investments and broader economic growth. By integrating these findings into governance practices, this study contributes to sustainable development and financial stability in emerging markets</dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en-US">Master in Management, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Gadjah Mada</dc:publisher>
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	<dc:date>2026-02-09</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
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	<dc:type xml:lang="en-US">Peer-reviewed Article</dc:type>
	<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
	<dc:identifier>https://journal.ugm.ac.id/gamaijb/article/view/116168</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.22146/gamaijb.116168</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en-US">Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business; Vol 28, No 1 (2026): January; 1-24</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2338-7238</dc:source>
	<dc:source>1411-1128</dc:source>
	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://journal.ugm.ac.id/gamaijb/article/view/116168/43462</dc:relation>
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	<dc:relation>https://journal.ugm.ac.id/gamaijb/article/downloadSuppFile/116168/43828</dc:relation>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en-US">Copyright (c) 2026 Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business</dc:rights>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en-US">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0</dc:rights>
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