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A Game theoretic approach for competition over visibility in social networks

Bulletin of Electrical Engineering and Informatics · Vol. 8 No. 2 (2019) · hlm. 674–682

DOI
10.11591/eei.v8i2.728
ISSN
2089-3191, 2302-9285
Terbit
2019-06-01
Penerbit
Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science (IAES)
Bahasa
en

Abstrak

Social Networks have known an important evolution in the last few years. These structures, made up of individuals who are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, constitute the window for members to express their opinions and thoughts by sending posts to their own walls or others' timelines. Actually, when a content arrives, it's located on the top of the timeline pushing away older messages. This situation causes a permanent competition over visibility among subscribers who jump on opponents to promote conflict. Our study presents this competition as a non-cooperative game; each source has to choose frequencies which assure its visibility. We model it, exploring the theory of concave games, to reach a situation of equilibrium; a situation where no player has the ultimate ability to deviate from its current strategy. We formulate the named game, then we analyze it and prove that there is exactly one Nash equilibrium which is the convergence of all players' best responses. We finally provide some numerical results, taking into consideration a system of two sources with a specific frequency space, and analyze the effect of different parameters on sources' visibility on the walls of social networks.

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10 penulis · 21 tautan kepenulisan bersama · 6 lintas organisasi

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  • Université Sultan Moulay Slimane
  • University of Hassan II Casablanca
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  • Organisasi berbeda
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Rekan penulisOrganisasiArtikel bersama
Lhoussaine BouhouAfiliasi tidak diketahui4
Mohamed OukessouAfiliasi tidak diketahui4
Salah-Eddine MansourUniversity of Hassan II Casablanca1
Bouabid QabliyaneUniversité Sultan Moulay Slimane1
Abdelhak SakhiUniversity of Hassan II Casablanca1
Zakaria KhoudiUniversité Sultan Moulay Slimane1

Afiliasi berasal dari OpenAlex; metadata OAI-PMH jurnal tidak memuatnya. Penulis tanpa ID OpenAlex dicocokkan berdasarkan nama, sehingga dua orang bisa tergabung atau satu orang bisa terpisah.

Sumber metadata: OpenAlex API (jurnal SINTA, ADR 0048) https://openalex.org/S2765016208, pertama di-harvest 19 Nov 2026, terakhir terlihat 19 Nov 2026.
Metadata asli (oai_dc)
<oai_dc:dc xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/"><dc:title xml:lang="en">A Game theoretic approach for competition over visibility in social networks</dc:title><dc:creator>Khadija Touya</dc:creator><dc:creator>Mohamed Baslam</dc:creator><dc:creator>Rachid El Ayachi</dc:creator><dc:creator>Mostafa Jourhmane</dc:creator><dc:subject>social networks</dc:subject><dc:subject>non-cooperative game</dc:subject><dc:subject>concave games</dc:subject><dc:subject>Nash equilibrium</dc:subject><dc:subject>content promotion</dc:subject><dc:subject>best response dynamics</dc:subject><dc:description xml:lang="en">Social Networks have known an important evolution in the last few years. These structures, made up of individuals who are tied by one or more specific types of interdependency, constitute the window for members to express their opinions and thoughts by sending posts to their own walls or others' timelines. Actually, when a content arrives, it's located on the top of the timeline pushing away older messages. This situation causes a permanent competition over visibility among subscribers who jump on opponents to promote conflict. Our study presents this competition as a non-cooperative game; each source has to choose frequencies which assure its visibility. We model it, exploring the theory of concave games, to reach a situation of equilibrium; a situation where no player has the ultimate ability to deviate from its current strategy. We formulate the named game, then we analyze it and prove that there is exactly one Nash equilibrium which is the convergence of all players' best responses. We finally provide some numerical results, taking into consideration a system of two sources with a specific frequency space, and analyze the effect of different parameters on sources' visibility on the walls of social networks.</dc:description><dc:publisher>Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science (IAES)</dc:publisher><dc:date>2019-06-01</dc:date><dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type><dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format><dc:identifier>https://doi.org/10.11591/eei.v8i2.728</dc:identifier><dc:identifier>10.11591/eei.v8i2.728</dc:identifier><dc:source>Bulletin of Electrical Engineering and Informatics; Vol 8 No 2 (2019); 674-682</dc:source><dc:source>2089-3191</dc:source><dc:source>2302-9285</dc:source><dc:language>en</dc:language><dc:relation>https://beei.org/index.php/EEI/article/download/728/1078</dc:relation></oai_dc:dc>