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Bank Indonesia and the Evolution of Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking: A Comparative Perspective

Hasanuddin Civil and Bussiness Law Review · Vol. 3 No. 1 (2026) · hlm. 17–32

DOI
10.20956/kmrn3659
ISSN
3089-0144
Terbit
2026-10-05
Penerbit
Civil Law Departmen of Faculty of Law, Hasanuddin University
Bahasa
en
Lisensi
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0

Abstrak

The constitutional status of central banks raises a fundamental tension between monetary-policy independence and democratic accountability, particularly in emerging constitutional democracies undergoing institutional reform. This article examines how Indonesia’s constitutional and statutory framework structures the independence and accountability of Bank Indonesia and compares its institutional design with the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve System, and the Bank of England. Using doctrinal legal research and a functional comparative constitutional approach, the analysis focuses on constitutional entrenchment, statutory delegation, and accountability mechanisms. It examines Article 23D of the 1945 Constitution, the Bank Indonesia Law, the financial-sector reforms introduced by Law No. 4 of 2023, and their latest recalibration under Law No. 4 of 2026. The findings show that Bank Indonesia combines constitutional recognition with statutorily structured operational autonomy, an expanded monetary and macroprudential mandate, inter-institutional financial-stability coordination, and increasingly structured parliamentary accountability. Unlike the treaty-entrenched European Central Bank and the predominantly statute-based Federal Reserve and Bank of England, Bank Indonesia occupies an intermediate constitutional position. The article conceptualises this arrangement as Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking, in which constitutional entrenchment, legislative adaptability, operational independence, and democratic accountability coexist. The post2026 framework further demonstrates that the central constitutional challenge is not whether Bank Indonesia remains formally independent, but how accountability and coordination can be strengthened without permitting political interference in monetary judgment.

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Sumber metadata: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/hcblr/oai, pertama di-harvest 2 Nov 2026, terakhir terlihat 15 Nov 2026.
Metadata asli (oai_dc)
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en">Bank Indonesia and the Evolution of Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking: A Comparative Perspective</dc:title>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Rozi Beni</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Rajagukguk, Blucer W.</dc:creator>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Bank Indonesia</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Central Bank Independence</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Comparative Constitutional Law</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Democratic Accountability</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Comparative Constitutional Law</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking</dc:subject>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en">The constitutional status of central banks raises a fundamental tension between monetary-policy independence and democratic accountability, particularly in emerging constitutional democracies undergoing institutional reform. This article examines how Indonesia’s constitutional and statutory framework structures the independence and accountability of Bank Indonesia and compares its institutional design with the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve System, and the Bank of England. Using doctrinal legal research and a functional comparative constitutional approach, the analysis focuses on constitutional entrenchment, statutory delegation, and accountability mechanisms. It examines Article 23D of the 1945 Constitution, the Bank Indonesia Law, the financial-sector reforms introduced by Law No. 4 of 2023, and their latest recalibration under Law No. 4 of 2026. The findings show that Bank Indonesia combines constitutional recognition with statutorily structured operational autonomy, an expanded monetary and macroprudential mandate, inter-institutional financial-stability coordination, and increasingly structured parliamentary accountability. Unlike the treaty-entrenched European Central Bank and the predominantly statute-based Federal Reserve and Bank of England, Bank Indonesia occupies an intermediate constitutional position. The article conceptualises this arrangement as Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking, in which constitutional entrenchment, legislative adaptability, operational independence, and democratic accountability coexist. The post2026 framework further demonstrates that the central constitutional challenge is not whether Bank Indonesia remains formally independent, but how accountability and coordination can be strengthened without permitting political interference in monetary judgment. </dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en">Civil Law Departmen of Faculty of Law, Hasanuddin University</dc:publisher>
	<dc:date>2026-10-05</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
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	<dc:type xml:lang="en">Peer-reviewed Article</dc:type>
	<dc:type xml:lang="en">Text</dc:type>
	<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
	<dc:identifier>https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/hcblr/article/view/50471</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.20956/kmrn3659</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en">Hasanuddin Civil and Bussiness Law Review; Vol. 3 No. 1 (2026): VOLUME 3 ISSUE 1 2026; 17-32</dc:source>
	<dc:source xml:lang="id">Hasanuddin Civil &amp; Business Law REview; Vol 3 No 1 (2026): VOLUME 3 ISSUE 1 2026; 17-32</dc:source>
	<dc:source>3089-0144</dc:source>
	<dc:language>en</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/hcblr/article/view/50471/15112</dc:relation>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en">Copyright (c) 2026 Hasanuddin Civil and Bussiness Law Review</dc:rights>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</dc:rights>
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