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The Institutional Restructuring of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping

Hasanuddin Journal of International Affairs · Vol. 5 No. 1 (2025) · pp. 75–85

DOI
10.31947/hjirs.v5i1.43692
ISSN
2775-3336, 2774-7328
Published
2025-04-10
Publisher
Department of International Relations, Hasanuddin University
Language
en

Abstract

This paper investigates the internal restructuring of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Xi Jinping’s leadership and its influence on policy-making and foreign policy behavior. Drawing on an integrated theoretical framework that combines the Bureaucratic Politics Model and Two-Level Game Theory, the study examines how China's increasingly centralized political architecture allows for a more coherent implementation of policies from the top down. The paper argues that the restructuring of the CCP through the consolidation of decision-making power within the Politburo Standing Committee, the elevation of Party-led commissions, and the expanding control over state bureaucracies not only enhance administrative efficiency but also to strategically align domestic priorities with China’s international ambitions. Domestic economic policies, often managed by Party-led bureaucracies, now function as instruments of external leverage. This analysis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of China's domestic–international policy nexus, particularly how centralized authority and controlled bureaucratic channels reduce fragmentation in domestic preferences, thereby shaping China’s negotiation behavior, strategic signaling, and foreign policy consistency.

Keywords

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Munjin Syafik Asy'ariAffiliation unknown1
Patrice LumumbaAffiliation unknown1

Affiliations come from OpenAlex; journal OAI-PMH metadata carries none. Authors without an OpenAlex ID are matched by name, which can merge or split people.

Metadata source: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/hujia/oai, first harvested 2 Nov 2026, last seen 2 Nov 2026.
Original metadata (oai_dc) 
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en">The Institutional Restructuring of the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping</dc:title>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Rifqillah, Muhammad Nail</dc:creator>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">China</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">communist party</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Xi Jinping</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">centralization</dc:subject>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en">This paper investigates the internal restructuring of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Xi Jinping’s leadership and its influence on policy-making and foreign policy behavior. Drawing on an integrated theoretical framework that combines the Bureaucratic Politics Model and Two-Level Game Theory, the study examines how China's increasingly centralized political architecture allows for a more coherent implementation of policies from the top down. The paper argues that the restructuring of the CCP through the consolidation of decision-making power within the Politburo Standing Committee, the elevation of Party-led commissions, and the expanding control over state bureaucracies not only enhance administrative efficiency but also to&amp;nbsp; strategically align domestic priorities with China’s international ambitions. Domestic economic policies, often managed by Party-led bureaucracies, now function as instruments of external leverage. This analysis contributes to a more nuanced understanding of China's domestic–international policy nexus, particularly how centralized authority and controlled bureaucratic channels reduce fragmentation in domestic preferences, thereby shaping China’s negotiation behavior, strategic signaling, and foreign policy consistency.</dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en">Department of International Relations, Hasanuddin University</dc:publisher>
	<dc:date>2025-04-10</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
	<dc:type xml:lang="en">Peer-reviewed Article</dc:type>
	<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
	<dc:identifier>https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/hujia/article/view/43692</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.31947/hjirs.v5i1.43692</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en">Hasanuddin Journal of International Affairs; Vol. 5 No. 1 (2025); 75 - 85</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2775-3336</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2774-7328</dc:source>
	<dc:source>10.31947/hjirs.v5i1</dc:source>
	<dc:language>en</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/hujia/article/view/43692/12700</dc:relation>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en">Copyright (c) 2025 Hasanuddin Journal of International Affairs</dc:rights>
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