The Taliban’s Victory as a Strategic Catalyst: Radicalism in Indonesia After a Flawed Global Peace Process

Abstract

The return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan in August 2021 marked a pivotal moment in global discourse, widely interpreted as a monumental victory for jihadist movements. This event was not a simple military takeover but the culmination of a flawed diplomatic initiative (the 2020 Doha Agreement) and a reflection of a broader U.S. grand strategy of retrenchment. In Indonesia, the principal locus of Jemaah Islamiyah activity, this event was expected to inspire renewed radical mobilization and violent escalation. However, this anticipated surge did not materialize. Instead, the post-2021 period has been characterized by ideological recalibration. This research contends that the reaction to the Taliban's return is best understood through the analytical lens of Social Movement Theory (SMT), situated within the context of a failed peace process. It argued that the Taliban's victory acted as a critical external shock that primarily functioned as ideological validation for the patient, long-term strategies of established groups like Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah (AJAI). The event simultaneously intensified the “framing contestation” with its pro-Islamic State (IS) rivals and, most critically, accelerated AJAI’s strategic evolution towards socio-political infiltration (tamkin siyasi). This has reshaped the primary radical threat in the region from overt attacks to strategic, long-term subversion, backed by AJAI's profound organizational resilience. The research analyzed these dynamics by examining shifts in political opportunities, resource mobilization, and framing processes, demonstrating how failures in global peacemaking can have complex and unforeseen consequences on regional extremist landscapes.

Keywords

• radicalism
• Indonesia
• Al Jamaah AL Islamiyah
• Taliban
• social movement theory
• Doha Agreement