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Terrorism Financing Modus Operandi In Indonesia

IJCLS (Indonesian Journal of Criminal Law Studies) · Vol. 10 No. 2 (2025) · pp. 685–722

DOI
10.15294/ijcls.v10i2.29593
ISSN
2548-1576, 2548-1568
Published
2025-11-05
Publisher
Universitas Negeri Semarang
Language
eng

Abstract

The dynamics of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia never cease. Even at the end of 2024, Densus 88 Antiterror arrested a number of perpetrators involved in various terrorist activities. This shows that radicalism and terrorism continue to develop through small cells that spread radical ideology. And, if we let our guard down, they will certainly carry out acts of terrorism using various schemes. To support these radical-terrorist activities, significant funding is required. There are at least two main channels: legal and illegal. Legal fund-raising by radical terrorist groups is carried out through certain disguised methods, such as donations, charity boxes, and some legal businesses. On the other hand, the illegal channel is known as "fai'," where they justify using methods such as robbery, theft, fraud, and others. Law Number 9 of 2013 on the Eradication and Prevention of Terrorism Financing Crimes serves as the legal basis for prosecuting terrorism financing activities. This study successfully uncovered various financing terrorism schemes. It was found in the field that radical groups still rely on legitimate businesses to fund their radical activities. In addition to conventional businesses, they utilise social media and virtual platforms to collect and transfer funds. They are more likely to use cryptocurrency, specifically Bitcoin, due to its anonymity and the difficulty in tracking it. Non-conventional methods such as cyber fraud in the form of investment scams, as well as cybercrimes like hacking websites and conducting other cyberattacks, can generate funds.

Keywords

Collaboration network of the authors

40 authors · 142 co-authorship links · showing the 40 most connected

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  • Universitas Respati Yogyakarta
  • Affiliation unknown
  • Different organisations
  • Same organisation
  • Affiliation unknown
  • Thicker line = more joint articles · bigger circle = more articles
Show as table
Co-authorOrganisationJoint articles
Ridwan ArifinAffiliation unknown6
Ubaidillah KamalAffiliation unknown6
Diandra Preludio RamadaAffiliation unknown5
Ali MasyharAffiliation unknown4
Rodiyah RodiyahAffiliation unknown4
Benny SumardianaAffiliation unknown4
Windiahsari WindiahsariAffiliation unknown3
Ratih DamayantiAffiliation unknown3
Salsabila TriandaniAffiliation unknown2
Rizqan NaelufarAffiliation unknown2
Nizamuddin AliasAffiliation unknown2
Asyaffa Ridzqi AmandhaAffiliation unknown2
Tegar Islami PutraAffiliation unknown2
Rio Taufik AnsoriAffiliation unknown2
Saniya PuspitasariAffiliation unknown2
Vira AzraAffiliation unknown2
Muhammad Adymas Hikal FikriAffiliation unknown2
Dina Wahyu PritaningtiasAffiliation unknown2
Anindhita Sekaring BarendriyasAffiliation unknown2
Amira Rahma SabelaAffiliation unknown2
Batari LaskarwatiAffiliation unknown2
Bayangsari WedhatamiAffiliation unknown2
Syukron SalamAffiliation unknown2
Iqbal SyariefudinAffiliation unknown2
Sri LestariUniversitas Respati Yogyakarta2
Muhammad Reza MaulanaAffiliation unknown2
Fauziah RamadhaniAffiliation unknown2
Sang Ayu Putu RahayuAffiliation unknown2
Rahayu Fery AnitasariAffiliation unknown2
Anis WidyawatiAffiliation unknown2
Varun ChhachharAffiliation unknown2
Asmarani RamliAffiliation unknown2
Martitah MartitahAffiliation unknown1
Kun Retno HandayaniAffiliation unknown1
Yuli Prasetyo AdhiAffiliation unknown1

Affiliations come from OpenAlex; journal OAI-PMH metadata carries none. Authors without an OpenAlex ID are matched by name, which can merge or split people.

Metadata source: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) https://journal.unnes.ac.id/journals/ijcls/oai, first harvested 5 Nov 2026, last seen 5 Nov 2026.
Original metadata (oai_dc)
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en">Terrorism Financing Modus Operandi In Indonesia</dc:title>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Ali Masyhar Mursyid</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Muhammad Haidar Ghoni</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Indah Sri Utari</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Aprila Niravita</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator xml:lang="en">Muhammad Azzam</dc:creator>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Financing Terrorism</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Modus</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">National Security</dc:subject>
	<dc:subject xml:lang="en">Illicit Financial Flows</dc:subject>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en">The dynamics of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia never cease. Even at the end of 2024, Densus 88 Antiterror arrested a number of perpetrators involved in various terrorist activities. This shows that radicalism and terrorism continue to develop through small cells that spread radical ideology. And, if we let our guard down, they will certainly carry out acts of terrorism using various schemes. To support these radical-terrorist activities, significant funding is required. There are at least two main channels: legal and illegal. Legal fund-raising by radical terrorist groups is carried out through certain disguised methods, such as donations, charity boxes, and some legal businesses. On the other hand, the illegal channel is known as "fai'," where they justify using methods such as robbery, theft, fraud, and others. Law Number 9 of 2013 on the Eradication and Prevention of Terrorism Financing Crimes serves as the legal basis for prosecuting terrorism financing activities. This study successfully uncovered various financing terrorism schemes. It was found in the field that radical groups still rely on legitimate businesses to fund their radical activities. In addition to conventional businesses, they utilise social media and virtual platforms to collect and transfer funds. They are more likely to use cryptocurrency, specifically Bitcoin, due to its anonymity and the difficulty in tracking it. Non-conventional methods such as cyber fraud in the form of investment scams, as well as cybercrimes like hacking websites and conducting other cyberattacks, can generate funds.</dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en">Universitas Negeri Semarang</dc:publisher>
	<dc:date>2025-11-05</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
	<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
	<dc:identifier>https://journal.unnes.ac.id/journals/ijcls/article/view/29593</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.15294/ijcls.v10i2.29593</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en">IJCLS (Indonesian Journal of Criminal Law Studies); Vol. 10 No. 2 (2025): Indonesia J. Crim. L. Studies (November, 2025); 685-722</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2548-1576</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2548-1568</dc:source>
	<dc:source>10.15294/ijcls.v10i2</dc:source>
	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://journal.unnes.ac.id/journals/ijcls/article/view/29593/6742</dc:relation>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en">Copyright (c) 2025 Indonesian Journal of Criminal Law Studies</dc:rights>
</oai_dc:dc>