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The Effect of Board of Commissioners and Independent Commissioners on Agency Cost through Capital Structure

Management Analysis Journal · Vol. 8 No. 1 (2019) · pp. 13–24

DOI
10.15294/maj.v8i1.23384
ISSN
2502-1451, 2252-6552
Published
2019-03-10
Publisher
Universitas Negeri Semarang
Language
eng

Abstract

Different interests between managers and shareholders can emerge agency conflicts resulting agency costs. The aim of this study is to determine the effect of board of commissioners and independent commissioners to agency cost through capital structure. This study was conducted on companies incorporated in the LQ45 Index listed on the BEI 2012-2016. The number of samples based on purposive sampling method is 24 companies or 120 analysis units. Multiple regression analysis and path analysis using Eviews 9 were used for methods of data analysis. The results showed that board of commissioners have positive and insignificant effect on capital structure, while independent commissioners have positive and significant effect on capital structure. The capital structure has a negative and significant effect on the agency cost proxied by asset utilization ratio, board of commissioners has a negative and insignificant effect on the agency cost proxied by asset utilization ratio, whereas the independent commissioner has a positive and significant effect on the agency cost proxied by asset utilization ratio. By using path analysis, capital structure is unable to mediate the effect of board of commissioners and independent commissioners against agency cost.

Collaboration network of the authors

31 authors · 41 co-authorship links

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Co-authorOrganisationJoint articles
Siti RidloahAffiliation unknown2
Gavida Novi WidodoAffiliation unknown1
Dwi CahyaningdyahAffiliation unknown1
Fafurida FafuridaAffiliation unknown1
Rini Setyo WitiastutiAffiliation unknown1
Syam WidiaAffiliation unknown1
Farid AhmadiAffiliation unknown1
Hanan MaulanaAffiliation unknown1
ngizzah khalwiyatun nisakAffiliation unknown1
Cahyati AgustinaAffiliation unknown1
Nisaa’ NuurillahAffiliation unknown1
Risalatin HijjahAffiliation unknown1
Riyantina RiyantinaAffiliation unknown1
deka erfianaAffiliation unknown1
Fajar MaulanaAffiliation unknown1
Ayang Aulia NurantoAffiliation unknown1
Tio DarmantoAffiliation unknown1
Tika IswariniAffiliation unknown1
Dwi AgustinaAffiliation unknown1
Dewi SukmawardiniAffiliation unknown1
Ayuk Nurmalita SariAffiliation unknown1
Ririn Amelia SariAffiliation unknown1
Adhi WidyaktoAffiliation unknown1
Yohanes SuhardjoAffiliation unknown1
rr Lulus Prapti NSSAffiliation unknown1
Mila AmaliaAffiliation unknown1
Dwi Endah PratiwiAffiliation unknown1
Arkan Fajri Eka PutraAffiliation unknown1
Tika ArismawatiAffiliation unknown1

Affiliations come from OpenAlex; journal OAI-PMH metadata carries none. Authors without an OpenAlex ID are matched by name, which can merge or split people.

Metadata source: OAI-PMH (metadata jurnal) https://journal.unnes.ac.id/sju/index.php/maj/oai, first harvested 6 Nov 2026, last seen 6 Nov 2026.
Original metadata (oai_dc) 
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	<dc:title xml:lang="en-US">The Effect of Board of Commissioners and Independent Commissioners on Agency Cost through Capital Structure</dc:title>
	<dc:creator>Wahidah, Siti Asroliatun</dc:creator>
	<dc:creator>Ardiansari, Anindya</dc:creator>
	<dc:description xml:lang="en-US">Different interests between managers and shareholders can emerge agency conflicts resulting agency costs. The aim of this study is to determine the effect of board of commissioners and independent commissioners to agency cost through capital structure. This study was conducted on companies incorporated in the LQ45 Index listed on the BEI 2012-2016. The number of samples based on purposive sampling method is 24 companies or 120 analysis units. Multiple regression analysis and path analysis using Eviews 9 were used for methods of data analysis. The results showed that board of commissioners have positive and insignificant effect on capital structure, while independent commissioners have positive and significant effect on capital structure. The capital structure has a negative and significant effect on the agency cost proxied by asset utilization ratio, board of commissioners has a negative and insignificant effect on the agency cost proxied by asset utilization ratio, whereas the independent commissioner has a positive and significant effect on the agency cost proxied by asset utilization ratio. By using path analysis, capital structure is unable to mediate the effect of board of commissioners and independent commissioners against agency cost.</dc:description>
	<dc:publisher xml:lang="en-US">Universitas Negeri Semarang</dc:publisher>
	<dc:date>2019-03-10</dc:date>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
	<dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
	<dc:type xml:lang="en-US">Peer-reviewed Article</dc:type>
	<dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
	<dc:identifier>https://journal.unnes.ac.id/sju/maj/article/view/23384</dc:identifier>
	<dc:identifier>10.15294/maj.v8i1.23384</dc:identifier>
	<dc:source xml:lang="en-US">Management Analysis Journal; Vol 8 No 1 (2019): Management Analysis Journal; 13-24</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2502-1451</dc:source>
	<dc:source>2252-6552</dc:source>
	<dc:source>10.15294/maj.v8i1</dc:source>
	<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
	<dc:relation>https://journal.unnes.ac.id/sju/maj/article/view/23384/13733</dc:relation>
	<dc:rights xml:lang="en-US">Copyright (c) 2019 Management Analysis Journal</dc:rights>
</oai_dc:dc>